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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)0).

DESCRIPTION OF AND REFERENCES TO PARTIES
The Appellants/Plaintiffs are individuals Wade S. Winegar and Sandra Winegar
(the "Winegars"). See Record ("R") pp. 1-2. The Appellees/Defendants are Springville
City (the "City") and two of its employees Bill Child and Jason Riding (the
"Employees") (collectively the "City"). Id. See also id. p. 316.

RESTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
As more fully set forth below, the Winegars' description of the issues presented
for review relies heavily on mischaracterizations of the evidence actually in the record.
Accordingly, the City restates the issues as follows:
I.

Whether the district court correctly held it did not have jurisdiction to

consider the Winegars' claims against the City because the Winegars failed to file their
~

Complaint within one year of the date the City's insurer denied the Winegars' notice of
claim as required by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (the "GIA"), Utah Code Ann.
§ 63G-7-403(2)(b ). 1
The City preserved this issue by its motion for summary judgment and supporting
papers. See R. pp. 364-66.

~

1

The numbering, but not the substance, of the applicable sections of the GIA changed
after the Winegars initiated this action in 2007. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-10 I,
et seq. For ease of reference the City will cite to the current version of the GIA.
1
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2.

Whether the district court correctly held it did not have jurisdiction over

claims against the Employees because the Winegars failed to sufficiently identify either
the names or any basis for claims against the Employees in the Winegars' notice of claim
as required by Utah Code Ann. § 63 G-7-401 (3 )(b) and because their Complaint was not
served within one year of the date the City denied the notice of claim.
The City preserved this issue by its motion for summary judgment and supporting
papers. See R. pp. 366-69.
3.

Whether the Winegars have established the necessary factual and legal

basis for their argument that the City is estopped or otherwise prevented by equitable
principles from asserting that the one-year limitation provision imposed by the GIA bars
the Winegars' Complaint.
The Winegars preserved this issue in their papers opposing the City's Motion for
Summary Judgment. See R. pp. 443-455.
If resolved in the City's favor the issues described above are dispositive and any
additional issues require no further consideration. See Greene v. Utah Transit Auth.,
2001 UT 109, ,Il 6 ("Compliance with the Immunity Act is necessary to confer subject
matter jurisdiction upon a trial court to hear claims against governmental entities.").
However, the district court went on to decide two additional questions from which the
Winegars appeal which present the following additional issues:
4.

Whether the district court correctly held that the Employees were acting

within the course and scope of their employment with the City so that the Winegars'
exclusive remedy, if any, was against the City.
2
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~

v,

The City preserved this issue by its motion for summary judgment and supporting

'1

papers. See R. pp. 370-72.
5.

Whether the district court correctly held that the City would be immune

from the Winegars' claims in any event because the alleged injuries were caused by the
City's management and control of flood waters and repair of a City storm drain system.
The City preserved this issue by its motion for summary judgment and supporting
papers. See R. pp. 372-74.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

"Summary judgment is appropriate only when 'there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Winegar v. Springville, 2014 UT App 9,

~

11 (citations omitted). This Court "review[s]

the grant of summary judgment for correctness, as a question of law, giving no deference
to the district court's legal conclusions." Id.
In addition, and as the district court recognized:

~

A summary judgment movant must show both that there is no material
issue of fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "Where the moving party would bear the burden of
proof at trial, the movant must establish each element of his claim in order
to show that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Orvis v.
Johnson, 2008UT2112. "A summary judgment movant, on an issue
where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, may
satisfy its burden on summary judgment by showing by reference to 'the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any,' that there is no genuine issue of
material fact." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Orvis, at 118. "Upon such a showing,
whether or not supported by additional affirmative factual evidence, the
burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who 'may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of the pleadings,' but 'must set forth specific facts

3
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showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."' Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e);
Orvis, at 118.
R. p. 516.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case and Course of Pertinent Proceedings.
On January 27, 2006, the Winegars filed a notice of claim with the City alleging

that some eight months earlier, on May 3 or 4, 2005, the "City Roads Department" had
damaged the Winegars' property while clearing a logjam in Hobble Creek adjacent to the
Winegars' property. See R. pp. 381-83. Beginning March 20, 2006, Mr. Lyle Kunz, an
adjustor for the City's insurer, the Utah Risk Management Mutual Association
("URMMA"), responded with several letters denying the Winegars' claims. Id. pp. 3 88,
396, 401.
In responsive correspondence and otherwise, the Winegars then, and for the first
time, sought to determine the identity of city employees involved in the work. See, e.g.,

id. pp. 381-83, 394, 398. When the City declined to provide the names, on April 24,
2006, the Winegars sent a letter to Mr. Kunz and the City attorney stating "I hereby
amend my claim to include not only Springville City but all the unidentified employees
who participated in any aspect of the work done at the above listed property .... " Id. p.
398-99.
The Winegars initiated this action on April, 24, 2007. See R. pp. 1-11. They
alleged that while doing work with heavy equipment in the Hobble Creek streambed and
environs, the City damaged or destroyed the Winegars' property and trees. Id. The

4
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Winegars asserted "causes of action" for negligent and intentional destruction of
property, "statutory" injuries to trees, trespass and "destruction of streambed." Id. Some
years later the Winegars' amended their Complaint to name and seek treble and punitive
damages against the Employees. See id. R. pp. 315-26 (First Amended Compl.).
The City answered in September 2007. See R pp. 12-22. As affirmative
defenses, the City alleged in pertinent part that the Winegars' claims were barred
pursuant to the limitations and retention of immunity provisions of the GIA. Id. See also
id. R. pp. 336-340 (answering First Amended Compl. and asserting defenses on behalf of
liJ

Employees).
For years after the City's answer there was little or no activity in the case. See,
e.g., Docket, 9-11-07 through 12-29-10. During the period from September 2007 to

December 2010, the district court issued some four Orders to Show Cause why the case
should not be dismissed. Id.
The first substantive activity occurred on April 15, 2011, when the City filed a
motion for summary judgment and supporting papers. See R. pp. 51-54. The City argued
~

that because the Winegars had failed to file the Complaint within one year of the date the
City's insurer had denied their notice of claim, the District Court did not have
jurisdiction. Id.
In its opening memorandum, the City supported its motion with only: i) the
Winegars' Notice of Claim dated January 27, 2006, ii) a letter dated March 20, 2006,
from Claims Adjuster Lyle Kunz, copied to the Springville City Attorney, stating that
"[b]ecause the City would not be held liable, we must respectfully decline to make any

5
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voluntary payments on this claim," and iii) the date Winegars' filed their Complaint. Id.
See also id. pp. 56-61.

After the Winegars responded, and the City filed a reply memorandum containing
additional facts as to Mr. Kunz's identity and the Winegars' understanding (see, e.g., R.
pp. 71-73 ), on or about June 7, 2011, the district court entered a minute entry dismissing
the Winegars' Complaint on the limitations and jurisdictional grounds argued by the City.
See R. pp. 95-98. 2

The Winegars appealed that decision. See R. pp. 135-36. After briefing, on or
about January 17, 2014, this Court vacated the district court's summary judgment on
procedural grounds. See R. pp. 169-82. The Court found that the City had not
adequately supported the factual bases of its motion in its opening memorandum, and the
City's addition of facts for the first time in its reply deprived the Winegars of an
opportunity to fully challenge the motion. Id. This Court therefore declined to address
other issues and remanded the case for further proceedings. Id.
After remand, the parties engaged for the first time in any discovery, including
depositions of parties and witnesses. See, e.g., Docket. See also R. pp. 196-350. The
Winegars also amended their Complaint to add claims against the Employees as
described above. Id.

2The

Winegars appealed directly from this minute entry, but this Court dismissed the
appeal and remanded because the minute entry did not state it was a final order as
required by Guisti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2, 1130-36. See R. 112-14.
The District Court entered a final order, and the Winegars then perfected an appeal from
the District Court>s first final order on October 18, 2012. Id. pp. 135-37.
6
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The City then again moved for summary judgment. See, e.g., R. pp. 354-424. In
vi

support of this motion, the City cited evidentiary facts and deposition testimony
establishing Mr. Kunz's identity and the Winegars' awareness of his denial, specifically
addressed claims against the Employees, and asserted additional grounds for dismissal.

Id. As the district court described the status at oral argument on the City's motion:
THE JUDGE: . . . So I think the bottom line is I don't view any decisions I
made in that ruling as the law of the case. And I don't view my decision as
to whether or not that was a denial letter something that rules what I do
deciding on the motion for summary judgment. Because as we're all aware
the motions, the motion and the opposition reply memo that I have now are
a world apart in detail and complexity from what I had when I made that
original decision. So as far as I'm concerned I'm starting over fresh. I think
this is a whole new ball game and I don't feel that I am bound by anything I
did before.
R. p. 562.

After the parties completed briefing on the City's second motion for summary
judgment and after oral argument, on March 30, 2015, the district court entered a final

xih

order granting the City's motion for summary judgment and dismissing the Winegars'
Complaint primarily on jurisdictional grounds. See R. pp. 512-31.
The Winegars timely appealed from this order on April 28, 2015. Id. pp. 533-34.

B.

Statement of Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for Review.
In the following section, the City quotes each of the facts the district court found

to be uncontroverted and upon which it relied in its Ruling and Order and provides
citations to the record where the City supported each statement of fact in its summary
judgment papers. Following each statement of fact, the City will describe the Winegars'

7
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

response to the fact, including any attempt the Winegars made to controvert or dispute
the fact:
1.
On January 27, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a notice of claim with
Springville City ("the City").
Ruling and Order ("Order"), R. p. 512; (Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment ("City Memo")), R. pp. 357, 381-83.
The Winegars did not address or dispute this statement of fact in their response.

See R. p. 436.
2.
The notice of claim filed on January 27, 2006 contained no
allegations indicating that the plaintiffs intended to pursue claims against
any Springville City employees individually.
Order, R. p. 512; City Mem., R. pp. 357-58 (citing and quoting Notice submitted at R. pp.
381-83).
The Winegars did not contradict or dispute this fact by citation to any portion of
the January 27, 2006, notice of claim or other evidence. See R. pp. 436-37. Instead, the
~

Wine gars provided an "explanation," asserting the City "was well aware" the Winegars
intended to pursue claims against employees, then describing what they characterize as
an "amended notice of claim" that did name "unidentified employees." Id.
Characteristically, however, in support of this "explanation" the Winegars did not
point to or cite any portion or statement in the notice of claim to demonstrate that it
actually contained any allegation indicating the Winegars intended to pursue claims
against any individual City employees. Id. Rather, in support of their "explanation" they
~

8
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generally cited to the whole Appendix of Exhibits the City had submitted in support of its
motion for summary judgment. Id.
3.
In March 2006 (and the other relevant time periods for this case), the
City's insurer was Utah Risk Management Mutual Association
("URMMA"); Lyle Kunz was the adjuster for URM:MA who handled the
plaintiffs' claim.
Order, R. p. 512; City Mem., R. p. 358 (citing and quoting deposition excerpts submitted
at R. pp. 385-86).
Again, the Winegars' response did not contradict or dispute this fact, but provided
an "explanation" to the effect that "this information was not made known to the Winegars
in March 2006 or in any other communications from the City." R. p. 437. In support of
this assertion, the Winegars cite to this Court's first opinion, Winegar v. Springville City,
v,

2014 UT App. 9,

,r 20.

In that opinion, however, the Court found only that the City had not initially
established this fact in support of its first motion. Id. See also Winegar, 2014 UT App.
~

9, ,r 20 ("While one might reach the conclusion that URM:MA was the City's insurer by a
series of logical steps -- e.g., the City asserts that it denied the claim; under Utah law, the
~

City could only deny the claim itself or through its insurer; the City itself did not write
the March 20 letter; therefore, URMMA must be the City's insurer -- those steps require
assumptions not supported by actual evidence and the conclusion they lead to is
necessarily speculative."). The opinion itself provides no facts contradicting the City's
statement. Id.

9
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Perhaps more importantly, in this instance the district court found by "actual
evidence" that Mr. Kunz was an adjustor for the City's insurer, URMMA. See Order, R.
p. 512. The court also noted that the Winegars' knew Mr. Kunz was "an adjustor" who
was handling Winegars' claim. Id. p. 513 ("In his deposition, Winegar stated that he had
been "working exclusively with Troy Fitzgerald, and out of the blue got a letter from
Lyle Kunz. [He] assumed he was an adjuster."):
Q.
I'll show you what we've marked as Deposition Exhibit 4. (Exhibit
No. 4 was marked.)
Q.
This is a letter dated April 20, 2006 from Lyle Kunz. Did you
receive this letter on or about April 21 of 2006?
A.

[Mr. Winegar] I believe I did, yes.

Q.

And did you have an understanding as to who Lyle Kunz was?

A.
I did not. I had been working exclusively with Troy Fitzgerald, and
out of the blue got a letter from Lyle Kunz. I assumed he was an adjustor.
Q.

For an insurance company?

A.

My assumption was an adjustor, based upon the letter.

Q.
Did you have any reason to think that he didn't speak for the city in
denying the claim?
I frankly wasn't sure; that's why I continued to contact Fitzgerald as
A.
well.
Q.
You didn't think he was an interloper writing you a letter denying
your claim?
A.

I assumed he had some involvement in the process, yes.

City Mem. Exhibit D, R. p. 392.
4.
On March 20, 2006, Lyle Kunz ("Kunz") wrote a letter to Winegar
in which Kunz denied the January 27, 2006, Notice of Claim. The first

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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vj

sentence of the letter states, "Our investigation into the claim you have
made against Springville City for damage to your landscaping and property
... is now complete." The final sentence states, "Because the City would
not be held liable, we must respectfully decline to make any voluntary
payments on this claim." The letter was signed by "Lyle Kunz, Claims
Adjuster."
Order, R. p. 513; City Mem., R. p. 358 (citing and quoting letter submitted as deposition
exhibit, at R. p. 388). 3
The Winegars did not dispute or contradict any portion of the letter quoted by the
district court, but again provide an "explanation" based on their "position [that] the
original notice of claim was amended per agreement of the parties on April 24, 2006 and
lt/J

therefor any purported denial could not have come until after the amended notice of claim
to be effective." R. pp. 437-38.
In support of their "explanation," however, the Winegars cite only to this Court's
first opinion, which did not establish any "amended" notice of claim as a factual matter,
and the City's Exhibit G, a letter in which Winegars acknowledge that Mr. Kunz's letter
of April 20, 2006, was an "outright denial of the claim," thereby actually supporting this
statement of fact. Id. At no point did the Winegars provide any legal support for their
~

apparently subjective belief that "any purported denial could not have come until after the
amended notice of claim to be effective." See, e.g., Order, R. p. 10 ("Neither the parties
nor the court could find any provision in the GIA which creates or allows for an amended
claim.").

3The

letter was on letterhead reflecting that Mr. Kunz was an adjustor for the "Utah Risk
Management Mutual Association." R. p. 358.
VI
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~

6.
On April 9, 2006 Winegar did not respond directly to Kunz, but,
instead, sent a letter to Troy Fitzgerald ("Fitzgerald"), the city attorney,
requesting additional information so he could "amend [his] claim prior to
the end of April to include these individuals." Winegar explained that "I
need to get the names of all those involved in cutting trees on the subject
property on or about May 8, 2005. Also, I will need the names of all those
involved in the decision-making process, direction and supervision of this
project."
Order, R. p. 513; City Mem., R. p. 360 (citing deposition testimony and letter submitted
as Exhibit E, at R. pp. 391-94).
The Winegars did not dispute or provide any evidence contrary to this statement of
fact, but offered the same "explanation" made in response to fact number 4, above,
characterizing their notice of claim as "amended." See R. p. 438.
7.
On April 20, 2006 Kunz responded to Winegar's April 9, 2006 letter
to Fitzgerald through another letter, which again stated that the notice of
claim had been denied on March 20, 2006. Winegar admits that he received
Kunz's letter. The letter is as follows:
Your letter dated April 9, 2006, addressed to Mr. Troy Fitzgerald,
has been referred to us for a response. Your claim was denied on
March 20, 2006. We are not prepared to continue negotiations with
you by providing the information you have requested in your letter.
If you chose to not accept our denial and if you chose to move this
claim to the next step, your attorney can gather this information
through the discovery process of the court syste[m]. (sic)
Order, R. p. 513; City Mem., R. p. 360 (citing deposition testimony and letter submitted
as Exhibit F, at R. pp. 391-92, 396).
The Winegars did not dispute or provide any evidence contrary to this statement of
fact, but again offered the same "explanation" made in response to fact number 4, above,
characterizing their notice of claim as "amended." See R. p. 439.

12
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8.
In a letter dated April 24, 2006, Winegar responded to Kunz's letter
from April 20, 2006 and acknowledged that the claim had been "outright"
denied. Because the City had refused to provide him the names of the
individuals involved in clearing the logjam, he stated,
I hereby amend my claim to include not only Springville City but all
the unidentified employees who participated in any aspect of the
work done ... participated in the decision-making to do such work
or carried trees or timber off the property. If you believe I must
follow a different process to amend my claim, please let me know
immediately.
Winegar sent a copy of the letter to Fitzgerald, as well.
Order, R. p. 514; City Mem., R. p. 360 (citing deposition testimony and letter submitted
~

as Exhibit G, at R. pp. 391-92, 398) ("Given [Kunz's] stance and outright denial of the
claim I wasn't aware we were in negotiations.") (emphasis added).
Again, the Winegars did not cite to any deposition testimony, affidavit or other
evidence contradicting this fact. See R. pp. 439. Rather, they cite to the City's Exhibits
C, F and G which are simply letters written by Mr. Kunz and Mr. Winegar quoted above.

\1i

Id. They go on to repeat the "explanations" concerning an amended notice addressed

above. Id.
9.
Kunz responded to Winegar's April 24, 2006 letter with another
letter dated May 10, 2006, in which Kunz warned Winegar that Kunz's
"review of [the] letter indicates that it would not qualify as an amended
Notice of Claim since it is not directed to the right department within the
City." Kunz also stated that the City would "stand on the original denial
which was conveyed to you in our letter dated March 20, 2006."
Order, R. p. 514; City Mem., R. p. 361 (citing deposition testimony and letter submitted
as Exhibit H, at R. pp. 391-92, 401).
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Winegars did not purport to contradict or provide any "explanation" in response to
this fact. See generally R. pp. 436-440.
10.
The plaintiffs initiated this action on April 24, 2007 by filing a
complaint (Civil No. 070401317) in the Provo Department of the Fourth
Judicial District Court, Utah County, Utah.
Order, R. p. 514; City Mem., R. p. 361.
Winegars did not purport to contradict or provide any "explanation" in response to
this fact. See generally R. pp. 436-440.
11.
In May 2005 defendant Jason Riding ("Riding") was employed by
the Springville City Streets Department.
12.
On approximately May 5, 2005 Riding was directed by another city
employee, Bill Child ("Child"), to remove a logjam in Hobble Creek.
13.
Riding received instructions from Child to remove the logjam,
remove the island, capture and remove the debris out of the creek, and haul
it off and dispose of it.
14.
Riding's regular job responsibilities included walking the creek with
Child and his crew every year to look for logjams.
15.

In May 2005 Bill Child was the City's Superintendent of Roads.

16.
As the superintendent, Child was responsible for maintaining the
City's streets, as well as maintaining water flow through Hobble Creek.
17.
In late April or early May 2005, the City received a report that a
logjam was spotted in Hobble Creek. The report also indicated that run-off
water was running high and portions of the land adjacent to the stream were
under water.
18.
Child and his crew responded and observed that a logjam was
causing the river to back up and that portions of the river bank were falling
into the creek.
19.
Child testified that, in directing his crew to clear the logjam, he was
not singling out any property in particular, but he was trying to preserve
property on the entire north side of the creek.
14
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20.
Springville City Ordinances§ 4-12-101 and§ 4-12-102(15) make
Hobble Creek part of the Springville City Storm Water Drainage system.
Order, R. pp. 514-15; City Mem., R. pp. 361-64 (citing discovery responses, excerpts of
deposition testimony and City ordinances submitted as Exhibits I, J, K and L, R. pp. 40309, 412-423).
The Winegars responded to these facts primarily by quoting selectively from
testimony by the City's Public Works Director, Brad Stapley, who testified:

Q.
[Winegar] As a director of public works, what is your understanding
of what can be done in a creek without getting permission from the state or
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers?
vi

A.
[Stapley] We've been told that we can go in and hand work in the
creek and remove debris and so forth. (Stapley Dep., 16: 7-12, Ex. 1).
R. pp. 440-41 (also asserting that "[e]xcavating in the stream with a track hoe would go
beyond what the City would be permitted to do without a valid permit from the State of
Utah or U.S. Army Corp of Engineers.") (citing and quoting deposition testimony, R. p.

~

458). 4 Based on that testimony, and the testimony of one of the Employees that he would
not permit an illegal act, the Winegars characterize the Employees' conduct as "illegal"

vi
4

Mr. Stapley went on to testify:
Q.

So if you were to take heavy equipment in there, would that require
you to go to the state or U.S. Army Corps of Engineers?

A.

Typically if we wanted to go and take equipment in, we would call
the state, but, again, there has been instances where if they deem it's
an emergency, we've gone in and done work and then talked to the
state after.

R. p. 458.

15
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and thus evidence the Employees were acting outside the course and scope of their
employment with the City. See R. pp. 440-41.

C.

Response to Winegars' Statement of Facts.
The Winegars' brief contains extended factual characterizations which are not

supported by specific citations to any particular portions of the record where the "facts"
they describe were actually established. See Winegars' Brief, pp. 12-17. See also id. pp.
13, 14 (describing "facts" and citing generally to the whole of the Winegars'
Memorandum in Opposition, "R. 431-455."). This is important because "[i]t is not [the
appellate court's] obligation ... to comb the record for evidence." In re W.A., 2002 UT
127, ,r 45; Kou/is v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 746 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah Ct.App.1987)
(stating that the court will not "consider any facts not properly cited to, or supported by,
the record" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The Winegars' most significant failure in this regard undermines the primary basis
of the Winegars' appeal - that the Winegars exercised the required due diligence in
serving their notice of claim and in subsequent attempts to comply with the GIA, and
therefore the City should be estopped from asserting the GIA's limitation provision as a
bar to their Complaint because of the City's allegedly confusing or misleading actions.
For example, with no citation to the record the Winegars make statements
throughout their brief to the effect that:
Winegars did all they could without the cooperation of the City. But for
this first refusal by the City, the claim form would have been properly
submitted on January 27, 2006.
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~

The City should not be rewarded when they [sic] fail to cooperate in
identifying employees required to be listed on the notice of claim ....
There is no benefit to either party in hiding such infonnation, rather than
disclosing and allowing the original notice of claim to proceed without
questions of timeliness or tolling. But the City decided otherwise and
refused to disclose the names.

These actions by the City include:
-repeatedly withholding from claimants simple information needed
to properly file a claim which then created the need for an
amendment ....

[T]he original notice of claim describes the conduct, even though the
Winegars could not yet state names or specific detail due to the
City's withholding that information.
Winegars' Brief, pp. 22-25, 34, 42 (emphasis added).
In fact, however, there was no "first refusal by the City" and no evidence at all that
before the Winegars submitted the original notice of claim the Winegars had any contact
with the City whatsoever. Significantly, Winegars have not and cannot cite to any record
evidence demonstrating Winegars did anything, whether by calling or emailing the City,

vJ

submitting a GRAMA request or otherwise, to determine the names of the Employees
before serving their notice of claim. See generally R. The Winegars' bald statements
and related insinuations to the effect that the City did something to hamper the Winegars
ability to name the Employees before the Wine gars submitted their January 2006 notice
of claim are not only unsupported by the record, but are misleading.
Significantly, the Winegars' "statement of relevant facts" fails to cite a single
affidavit, or deposition or any other admissible evidence suggesting: ( 1) that the
17
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Winegars' made any effort whatsoever to discover the identity of the Employees during
the more than eight months after the incident and before serving their notice of claim; or
(2) that the Winegars were in fact misled or deceived or affirmatively relied upon any of
the City's allegedly misleading or confusing actions in waiting more than 12 months after
acknowledging their claim had been "outright" denied, and more than 10 months after
being told their "amended" notice was insufficient, before filing the Winegars'
Complaint. See, e.g., Winegars' Brief, pp. 11-17.
This failure is illustrated by more specific response to the Winegars' statement of
facts in other particulars. For example, the Wine gars quote from outdated language on
the City's Notice of Claim form stating:
UNDER STATE LAW, THE CITY HAS 90 DAYS IN WHICH TO
RESPOND TO A CLAIM. IF THE CITY DOES NOT RESPOND
WITHIN 90 DAYS, THE CLAIM IS DEEMED DENIED.

~

Winegars' Brief, p. 14. They then go on to assert:
Though this language was incorrect (yet still used by the City until at least
September 2012 more than 8 years after the statutory change), it would
become important because the Winegars relied on this language in
understanding when the claim would be deemed denied under state law.

Id. (emphasis added).
In fact, however, the Winegars fail to cite to any evidence in the record
whatsoever suggesting that the Winegars did in fact rely upon this deemed-denied
language in understanding when their claim was denied, or in calculating the time in
.

.

which to file their complaint. See id. On the contrary, the Winegars expressly told the
district court they did not rely upon the deemed-denied language during oral argument:
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THE JUDGE:
Can I interrupt you [the City's counsel] for just a
second -- and ask Mr. Winegar. He's correct, nobody is arguing about the
60 day versus the 90 day issue, that's not an issue in their motion for
summary judgment and I didn't see it as an issue in your opposition memo.
ls that right?

l\1R. WINEGAR:
apply.

There is no argument that that is the period that would

R. p. 566. See also Order, R. p. 9 ("During oral argument the parties agreed that the
~

plaintiffs were not asserting that a 90-day denial period applied rather than the statutory
period of 60 days.").
Finally, the Winegars begin their statement of facts with an extended and detailed
description of how and why the Employees accessed Hobble Creek, the allegedly specific
actions they took once they were there and the order in which they performed their
operations. See Winegars' Brief, pp. 12-14 (citing the whole of their Memorandum in
Opposition, "R. 431-455."). Similarly, in argument the Winegars baldly assert:

~

~

[T]he clearly egregious conduct was what was done after the log jam had
been cleared and Child and Riding were on their way out of the stream.
The removal of the island enlarging the stream bed and destruction of the
stream bank took place after, for now apparent reason other than the stream
would flow better around the curve.

Id. (without citation).
These factual assertions should be disregarded because nowhere in the portions of
the record Winegars cite, certainly not in the entirety of their memorandum in opposition,

vJP

do the Wine gars provide actual evidence of the details of the work they purport to
describe in their brief on appeal. Compare Winegars' Brief, pp. 12-14 with R. pp. 431-
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455. Mr. Winegar was not present during the Employees' work, 5 and the details or work
the Winegars describe in support of their arguments on appeal are unsupported
characterizations on which this Court cannot rely. See West Jordan City v. Goodman,
2006 UT 27, 133 ("' [T]his court need not, and will not[,] consider any facts not properly
cited to, or supported by, the record. "')(second alteration and emphasis in original).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The actions giving rise to the Winegars' claims occurred on May 5, 2005. There
is no evidence the Winegars made any effort to contact the City after that date until
January 7, 2006, when the Winegars served the City with a notice of claim generally
describing claims arising from activities by the City's "Roads Department" responding to
flooding in Hobble Creek, part of the City's storm drain system.
Less than 60 days later on or about March 20, 2006, the City's insurer responded
to the notice and informed the Winegars their notice of claim was denied. The insurer
then reiterated the denial and the March 20 date in letters on April 20, and again on May

5As

Mr. Winegar testified:
Q:

And how do you - how is it that you claim these trees were removed?

A:

My assumption was that they were cut down. From other depositions, I
understand that they were knocked down with a single trackhoe.

Q:

Well, the depositions that I've been at, there's only been an indication that
there were a couple of trees removed with the backhoe?

A:

How the rest were removed, I don't know. I wasn't present.

R. (Winegar Depo.) p 391.
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10, 2006, expressly rejecting the Winegars' "amended" notice. On April 24, 2006, the
Winegars' acknowledged in writing their claim had been "outright" denied prior to that
date. Nevertheless, the Winegars did not file their complaint until April 24, 2007.
The Winegars thus failed to file their complaint within a year of when their claim
was denied in order to comply with the GIA and give rise to jurisdiction over their claims
against the City. Whether and to what extent the Winegars effectively amended their
notice of claim by their letter of April 24, 2006, is irrelevant because Utah law is clear
that the time for filing a lawsuit under the GIA can be triggered only once.
vi

Similarly, the Winegars' notice of claim did not include the name of any City
employee as expressly required by the GIA, thus failing to give rise to jurisdiction over
claims subsequently asserted against the Employees. Even had the notice included the
names, it was inadequate to confer jurisdiction because it failed to even generally
describe conduct that would give rise to any personal or individual liability by any
employee.
The Winegars' arguments that their failure to comply with the GIA should be
excused or the City estopped from asserting the GIA' s limitations provisions are factually
and legally unsupported. The Winegars' failed to make any effort to identify the
Employees prior to filing their notice of claim, and they have not and cannot cite to any

v;J

authority to support the notion they could have reasonably relied upon an "amended"
notice, made after the original notice had been denied, to extend the deadlines for-~· -

~

compliance with the GIA.
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Nor have the Winegars established that they in fact relied on any of the City's
allegedly misleading or confusing actions in determining when their claim was denied or
computing the time for filing their complaint, especially in light of their written
acknowledgment their claim had been "outright" denied prior to April 24, 2006.
Certainly the Winegars have not and cannot point to any "specific, written representation
directly related to [satisfaction of the GIA's notice of claim requirements], such as a
statement that [the Winegars] had satisfied the GIA's requirements or that [the City]
would not assert the defense in litigation" which Utah case law requires in order to estop
a governmental entity.
Because the Winegars failed to invoke the district court's jurisdiction by
complying with the GIA and fail to establish any judicially cognizable excuse, there is no
reason to address their other arguments on appeal. Nevertheless, the Winegars failed to
establish any "willful misconduct" by the Employees or any definitively "illegal" acts, so
there is no basis to overturn the district court's determination the Employees were acting
within the course and scope of their employment in any event.
Similarly, the Winegars' failed to establish their injuries were proximately caused
by anything other than the City's management of floodwaters in Hobble Creek or repair
of that portion of the City's storm drain system. Accordingly, the district court correctly
held the City was immune from the Winegars' claims in any event.
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~

ARGUMENT

I.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE WINEGARS
FAILED TO FILE THEIR COMPLAINT WITHIN ONE YEAR OF THE
DATE THE CITY'S INSURER DENIED THE WINEGARS' NOTICE OF
CLAIM, THUS DEPRIVING THE COURT OF JURISDICTION.
The Limitations Provision of the GIA provides:
(l)(a) Within 60 days of the filing of a notice of claim, the governmental
entity or its insurance carrier shall inform the claimant in writing that the
claim has either been approved or denied.

(b) A claim is considered to be denied if, at the end of the 60-day period,
the governmental entity or its insurance carrier has failed to approve or
deny the claim.
(2)(a) If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action in the district
court against the governmental entity or an employee of the entity.
(b) The claimant shall begin the action within one year after denial of the
claim or within one year after the denial period specified in this chapter has
expired, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is
characterized as governmental.
Utah Code Ann.§ 630-7-403 (emphasis added).
Compliance with these requirements was necessary to allow the district court to
exercise jurisdiction over the Winegars' Complaint. See Davis v. Cent. Utah Counseling

Ctr., 2006 UT 52, ,r 41 (citing Greene, 2001 UT 109, ,I16 ("Compliance with the
Immunity Act is necessary to confer subject matter jurisdiction upon a trial court to hear
claims against governmental entities.")).
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has recently affirmed that a claimant's
compliance with the GIA's requirements must be exacting:
We consistently have interpreted the Immunity Act to require strict
compliance by plaintiffs. In Gallegos v. Midvale City, we explained that
the "allowance of a claim against [a governmental entity] is a statutorily
23
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created exception to the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity. Inasmuch as the
maintenance of such a cause of action derives from such statutory authority,
a prerequisite thereto is meeting the conditions prescribed in the statute."
The statutory right to sue a governmental entity "may be circumscribed by
any conditions that the Legislature may see fit to impose," and compliance
with those conditions is an "indispensable prerequisite" in suits against
governmental entities. The requirement of strict compliance, therefore, is a
recognition of the government's sovereign immunity and its right to dictate
the terms and conditions of its waiver of that immunity.

Davis, 2006 UT 52, ,r 42 (emphasis added, citations omitted, other alterations in original).
See also Wheeler v. McPherson, 2002 UT 16, ,r 14 (reiterating that ''parties claiming
damages due to governmental action must strictly comply with the Immunity Act in
order to bring suit")(emphasis added). 6
In support of the motion under review in this appeal, the City presented undisputed
evidence that Winegars received the first response to their Notice of Claim by letter dated
March 20, 2006, signed by Lyle Kunz, who was an adjuster for the City's insurer,
URRMA. The letter begins by stating that "[ o]ur investigation into the claim you have
made against Springville City for damage to your landscaping and property ... is now
complete." It closes by stating "[b]ecause the City would not be held liable, we must
respectfully decline to make any voluntary payments on this claim."
The unambiguous language of the statute requires the City's insurer to give notice
the claim had been "approved or denied." See Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-7-403(1)(a).

6These

cases and their rationale undermine any legal basis for the Winegars rather
extended arguments that the district court erred by not holding the City to a standard of
"strict compliance" with the GIA. See, e.g., Winegars' Brief, pp. 36-40. In any event
and as more fully set forth below, as a factual matter the City did strictly comply with the
GIA's requirements.
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tit,

Nothing in the letter can be interpreted as informing the Winegars their claims had been
~

approved, and thus the letter can only be construed as informing Winegars their claim
was denied. Significantly, it is undisputed that the Winegars acknowledged as much in
writing on April 24, 2006, referring to their claim as having previously been "outright"
denied.
In two additional letters, one dated April 20, 2006, and another dated May 10,
2006, Mr. Kunz then again informed the Winegars their claim had been denied on March
20, 2006, in these letters expressly using the word "denied." In the last of these, he also

vJ

cautioned the Winegars' that their "amended" notice of claim was ineffective.
Nevertheless, the Winegars did not file their Complaint until April 24, 2007, more
than 13 months after Mr. Kunz's first and second letters informing Winegars their claim
was denied on March 20, 2006, more than a year after they had themselves determined
the claim had been "outright" denied, and more than 10 months after Mr. Kunz' s last

~

letter reiterating the date of denial and rejecting their "amended" notice. The Winegars'
Complaint was thus time barred and the district court could not exercise jurisdiction. See

Greene, 2001 UT 109, ,I16 ("Compliance with the Immunity Act is necessary to confer
subject matter jurisdiction upon a trial court to hear claims against governmental
entities.").
Nor do the Winegars' arguments concerning their "amended" notice of claim
affect this conclusion. In Monarrez v. UDOT, 2016 UT 10, the Utah Supreme Court held
~

that a notice of claim can be denied only once. "We accordingly hold that the letter sent
by UDOT purporting to deny Mr. Monarrez's claim was not a valid denial and did not
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trigger the year-to-file period because it was sent after the claim had already been deemed
denied." Monarrez, 2016 UT 10, 1 IO. See also id.

,r 16 ("[T]he better reading of the

statute is that a denial -- whether by operation of law or by written notice -- can occur
only once within this sixty-day timeframe.").
Accordingly, once the Winegars' notice of claim had been denied, especially
"outright" denied as the Winegars acknowledged, there is no statutory or other
mechanism by which their letter purporting to "amend" the previously denied claim could
restart the limitations provision, regardless of their subjective view of its effect. See id.
See also id.

II.

,r 18 ("the time for filing a lawsuit can be triggered only once.").

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD IT DID NOT HAVE
JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER CLAIMS AGAINST THE EMPLOYEES
BECAUSE THE WINEGARS' NOTICE OF CLAIM. FAILED BOTH TO
NAME THE EMPLOYEES AND TO IDENTIFY ANY BASIS FOR
CLAIMS AGAINST THE EMPLOYEES.

The Winegars' note in passing that the GIA requires a claimant wishing to assert a
claim against an employee individually provide notice that includes "the name of the
employee." See Winegars' Brief, p. 41 (quoting Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-7-401(3)(b)).
Relying upon Peeples v. State of Utah, 2004 UT App 328, they go on to argue that their
notice of claim was adequate to allow the district court to exercise jurisdiction over
claims against the Employees because "the original notice of claim describes the conduct,
even though the Winegars could not yet state names or specific detail due to the City's
withholding that information." Winegars' Brief, p. 42 (emphasis added); see also

Winegars' Brief, p. 43 ("The information contained in the notice of claim form does
strictly comply with the GIA by providing a simple description of the conduct. The
26
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names were not included because of the City's refusal to disclose them."). This
~

argument fails factually and legally.
As set forth above, there is no evidence whatsoever that the Winegars couldn't
include the names of the Employees in their original notice because of any "withholding"

ll

of information or the City "refusing to disclose them." The Winegars simply have not
and cannot point to evidence in the record of any occasion during the more than eight
months after May 3 or 4, 2005, when their claims arose, and prior to January 27, 2006,
when they served their notice, where the Winegars made even the slightest effort to learn
the names of the Employees. Certainly there is no evidence of the City withholding
information or refusing to disclose anything whatsoever prior to January 2006. 7
The Winegars notice is insufficient to allow claims against the Employees for the
simple reason that it fails to include the name of any employee as required by Utah Code

7

On the contrary, in fact, on several occasions during briefing before the district court the
Winegars expressly represented that they didn't begin any attempts to identify employees
until after serving the notice of claim:

~

On January 27, 2006, Winegars filed a notice of claim form supplied by the
City for the damages incurred due to the May 2005 work. It is not disputed
that the notice of claim was properly served on the city clerk. The city clerk
passed on the notice of claim to the City attorney to handle.
Winegars then began discussions with the City attorney in an attempt to
gather the names of the employees involved in causing the damage as was
required by the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah ("GIA").

R. p. 433 (emphasis added). See also id. p. 228 ("Plaintiffs have been asking for the
individual names of the employees involved who damaged their property and a specific
description of who made the decisions and who did actually did the damage since the
notice of claim was filed in 2006.").
27
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Ann. § 63G-7-401(3)(b). Moreover, even assuming the Winegars' notice had included
employee names, Peeples is inapposite here and their notice of claim is insufficient for
additional reasons.
In Peeples, the Court considered only a claim against the State as an entity. See,
e.g., Peeples, 2004 UT App 328, 15. That case did not address what was required of a

notice of claim seeking to assert claims of individual liability against employees of the
government. Id.
Rather, as the Utah Supreme Court has subsequently stated when addressing
notice vis a vis governmental employees:
Under the UGIA's mandatory notice-of-claim provision, a claimant wishing
to use this exception [to assert claims against government employees] must
reasonably alert the governmental entity ... that the claims are based on
employee fraud or malice [or other willful misconduct].
Peak Alarm Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2010 UT 22,129. The notice of claim, taken as

a whole, "must be sufficient to reasonably alert the governmental entity of the nature of
the claim -- that the claimant seeks to bring a cause of action against a government
employee personally due to the employee's fraudulent or malicious conduct." Mecham v.
Frazier, 2008 UT 60, ,r 19.

In Peak Alarm, the claimant met this requirement ·where the plaintiff once used the .
term "malice" and alleged that the employee officers lacked facts to support a good faith
arrest, prosecuted him to punish him for his public opposition to the city's policy, and
acted "for the purpose of harassing, intimidating, punishing, or otherwise maliciously
inhibiting." 2010 UT 22, ,r 31.
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~

Applying these principles here, the Winegars describe their need for the names of
~

individual employees by asserting that:
[t]he Winegars' theory of the case was the individuals could be held
personally responsible for failing to obtain required permits, which failure
could impose criminal liability.
Winegars' Brief, p. 22. As the district court correctly noted, however, nowhere in the
Winegars' original notice of claim is there any mention of any potential individual

~

employee liability. See Order, R. pp. 11-14; compare .R. p. 3 83 (notice of claim).
Rather, the notice states that "[o]n May 4th , 2005 Springville City Roads
Department came down to this area of the stream to clear the logjam with a track hoe."
R. p. 3 83. It goes on to describe actions "they" took in the creek area, and goes on to
claim "the crew" removed dozens of trees. Id. However, nowhere does the notice mention
anyone being "personally responsible," failing to obtain required permits" or any "criminal
liability." Id. Indeed, it does not mention any individual or personal liability whatsoever.

~

Id.
While the Winegars' notice may well have generally "described the conduct" as
Winegars' assert, the notice simply does not put the City or even any member of the
"Roads Department" on notice that the Winegars would seek to bring causes of action
against any government employee personally. Even assuming it had contained the names

VP

of the Employees as the statute requires, the notice is insufficient under Meacham and
Peak Alarm and did not allow the district court to exercise jurisdiction over claims against

the Employees.
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III.

THE WINEGARS FAILED AND CONTINUE TO FAIL TO PROVIDE
THE COURT WITH ANY LEGAL OR FACTUAL SUPPORT FOR THEIR
ESTOPPEL ARGUMENTS.
Like the plaintiffs in Davis, before the district court and as the primary basis for

appeal, the Winegars essentially ask the Court "to consider what they characterize as the
confusing circumstances of their situation and recognize an exception to the rule of strict
compliance." Compare Davis, 2006 UT 52, 1143, 46, generally with Winegars' Brief.
Pursuant to the Court's opinion in Davis, this Court should decline the Winegars' request.
In Davis, the applicable provision of the GIA required plaintiffs "to deliver a
notice of claim to a member of [the defendant's] governing board, its executive director,
or its executive secretary." Davis, 2006 UT 52,143. The defendant, however, was an
interlocal agency serving six counties which "receive[d] substantial funding and
Ct.,

supervision from the State." Id. 146. Shortly prior to filing their notice of claim, the
plaintiffs' counsel spoke with a state employee and an Assistant Attorney General
"finaliz[ing]" the notice of claim, and ultimately delivered the notice to the State
Attorney General's office and the Juab County Clerk. Id. , 43.
Addressing plaintiffs' argument that the Court should recognize an exception to
the strict compliance requirements because of the confusing circumstances of their
situation, the Utah Supreme Court summarized the applicable case-law and held in
pertinent part as follows:
As we stated in Gurule, we have allowed for "less than strict compliance
[only] in cases which depended upon ambiguities in the [Immunity] Act;
ambiguities clarified by the 1998 amendments." Barring statutory
ambiguity, we have consistently declined to relax the requirements of the
Immunity Act.
30
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

For example, in Greene, we refused to create an exception to the strict
compliance rule where a claims adjuster employed by a state entity
allegedly misdirected the plaintiff as to where to send the requisite notice.
Though we expressed concern about the "intentionally misleading
behavior" alleged by the plaintiff, we nevertheless affirmed the dismissal of
the case:
Even assuming [the claims adjuster] made the statements [the
plaintiff] alleges he made, his delivery instructions cannot override
the requirements set by the legislature. Because [the plaintiff] failed
to strictly comply with the Immunity Act, the district court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over her claim.
We understand that claimants may face byzantine and confusing
bureaucracy when dealing with governmental entities. Indeed, government
employees and officials may even intentionally mislead plaintiffs in some
cases, as was alleged in Greene. Certainly, plaintiffs and their attorney in
this case faced a difficult task in navigating the communication channels of
an interlocal agency that serves six counties and receives substantial
funding and supervision from the State. Jurisdiction, however, does not
hinge on the difficulty of that task or the earnestness of plaintiffs' efforts.
Jurisdiction instead springs when a claimant has effected full compliance
with the Immunity Act. Barring statutory ambiguity, "we will not disturb
explicit legislative requirements" and abrogate the government's sovereign
immunity.

Plaintiffs must exercise the diligence necessary to effect strict compliance
with the Immunity Act. And the plaintiffs in this case failed to do so. After
conducting an initial investigation on December 23, 1998, plaintiffs'
attorney apparently did nothing until November 22, 1999 -- one day before
the limitations period expired. On that date, plaintiffs' attorney spoke with
an unidentified employee of the Division of Mental Health, called Assistant
Attorney General Reed Stringham, and finalized the notice of claim. What
plaintiffs' attorney never did -- and had one year to do -- was contact an
identified person of authority at [defendant]. Instead, he spoke with
unidentified employees of [defendant] and the Division of Mental Health
and relied on inferences and assumptions in directing the notice. Reliance
on inferences and assumptions does not constitute due diligence. Because
plaintiffs failed to exercise due diligence, we decline to recognize an
exception to the requirement of strict compliance.

~

31

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Davis, 2006 UT 52, 1144-46, 48 (alterations in original, citations omitted). See also
Greene, 200 I UT 109, 11 5-6 (affirming the dismissal of a claim because the claimant
failed to deliver the notice of claim to the appropriate party at UTA, even though she
misdirected her notice in reliance on statements made by a representative of UTA).
Applying these principles here, the Winegars' factual characterizations and
arguments simply fail to excuse their failure to strictly comply with the GIA and file their
claim within one year of the date on which it was denied. The Winegars primarily argue
that "the names [of the Employees] were needed to properly file a notice of claim."
Winegars' Brief, p. 22. See also id. pp. 25-26 (describing Winegars' requests for
information from the City because "they needed those names to amend their notice of
claim to include the individuals since the City had not disclosed the name[s] so far.").
Attempting to fault the City for not voluntarily providing those names when Winegars
asked after filing their notice of claim (which the Winegars characterize as exercising
"reasonable diligence"), the Winegars assert that "[a]t a minimum the statute would be
tolled for their [the City's] failure to disclose." Id. pp. 23-24.
This argument is foreclosed by Davis because the Winegars had more than eight
months from May 4, 2005, when they allege their claim arose (see R. p. 2, 17) until
January 27, 2006, when the Winegars served their notice of claim (see R. p. 382), to
make GRAMA requests, make requests in writing, email or by telephone, or otherwise
conduct investigations to discover the names of the Employees. But the Winegars fail to
cite any evidence whatsoever suggesting they did anything at all during this more than
eight-month period to identify the Employees. They have thus failed to demonstrate the
32
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necessary due diligence. See Davis, 2006 UT 52, 148 ("Plaintiffs must exercise the
~

diligence necessary to effect strict compliance with the Immunity Act. And the plaintiffs
in this case failed to do so. After conducting an initial investigation on December 23,
1998, plaintiffs' attorney apparently did nothing until November 22, 1999 -- one day
before the limitations period expired. . . . Because plaintiffs failed to exercise due
- diligence, we decline to recognize an exception to the requirement of strict
compliance.").
Next, the Winegars argue that City should be estopped from asserting the time bar

vii

arising from their failure to file their Complaint within one-year of the date their notice of
claim was denied for essentially two reasons: i) "[t]he City attorney agreed to amend the
notice of claim to remedy the city's refusal to give individual names to include in it"; and

ii) "the City misinformed claimants of critical information, such as its written notice of
claim form which informed claimants the deemed denied period was 90 days rather than
~

60 days and the City should be estopped from relying on their misstatements."
Winegars' Brief, pp. 25-33. These arguments also fail legally and factually.
The Utah Supreme Court has recently addressed estoppel in the GIA context,
noting in pertinent part:
There are three elements to estoppel: "(I) an admission, statement, or act
inconsistent with the claim afterwards asserted, (2) action by the other party
on the faith of such admission, statement, or act, and (3) injury to such
other party resulting from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate
such admission, statement, or act." "[T]he usual rules of estoppel do not
apply against" the government, however, and "courts must be cautious in
applying equitable estoppel against the State."
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In the context of the GIA, although no published case has directly
addressed what kind of statement may estop the government entity from
asserting that a claim was untimely, we have insisted on strict compliance
with the terms of the GIA even in the face of potentially intentional
misrepresentations about how to comply with the notice provisions of the
act. Thus, in order to estop UDOT from asserting the GIA's one year
limitations period as a defense, there must be a specific, written
representation directly related to that issue, such as a statement that [the
plaintiff] had satisfied the GIA's requirements or that the government would
not assert the defense in litigation.

Monarrez, 2016 UT 10, ,r,r 35, 37.
Applying these principles here, and as the District Court correctly noted, the
Winegars have not and cannot point to any "specific, written representation directly
related to [satisfaction of the GIA's notice of claim requirements], such as a statement
that [the Winegars] had satisfied the GIA's requirements or that [the City] would not
assert the defense in litigation." At most, the Winegars can point only to their own
written statement unilaterally characterizing their conversation with the City Attorney as
an agreement they could "amend" their notice of claim, and their assertion that "I will
consider the claim amended."
It is significant, however, that even assuming an amended notice of claim was
legally possible and the City agreed to it, the Winegars have not and cannot point to any
specific, written representation whatsoever that such an amendment would extend the
deadline for filing a Complaint. Nor is there any indication in the GIA or case law to
suggest that a notice of claim "amended" in the manner the Winegars describe would
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extend any deadlines. 8 The Winegars' unilateral assertions in a letter to the effect the
~

City agreed to an "amended" notice of claim is wholly insufficient to give rise to
estoppel, even assuming there was such an agreement. See Monarrez, 2016 UT I 0, ,r 37
("[I]n order to estop UDOT from asserting the GIA's one year limitations period as a
defense, there must be a specific, written representation directly related to that issue, such
as a statement that [the plaintiff] had satisfied the GIA's requirements or that the

x;i)

government would not assert the defense in litigation.").
It is also significant that "reasonable action or inaction by the [plaintiff] taken on

v.P

the basis of the first party's statement is one of three necessary elements [plaintiff] must
prove to invoke estoppel." Terry v. Retirement Bd., PEHP, 2007 UT App 87, ,r 16
(quotations, citation omitted). "Specifically, governmental entities are estopped from

44P

raising the Immunity Act as a defense where their statements 'induce' plaintiffs into
'delay[ing] filing [an] action,' or where such statements mislead plaintiffs into filing
~

notice of claim incorrectly." Wheeler, 2002 UT 16, ,r 18 (alterations in original)

(quoting Rice v. Granite School District, 456 P.2d 159, 163 (1969)).
In the same letter the Winegars' claim they "amended" their notice of claim, they
asked the City's insurer to "please let me know if the amended claim is denied as well."
More than 10 months before the statutory deadline, the insurer responded with a specific,
written rejection of the "amended" notice and reiteration of its original denial:

8

On the contrary, and as set forth above, the statutory scheme makes clear that the time
for filing a complaint begins to run once a notice of claim is denied in the first instance,
whether or not it is subsequently "amended" in some way. See Monarrez, 2016 UT 10, ,r
_ 18 ("the time for filing a lawsuit can be triggered only once.").
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A review of this letter indicates that it would not qualify as an amended
Notice of Claim since it is not directed to the right department within the
City.
Even if it did qualify as an amended Notice of Claim, we do not believe
that there is any significant additional information that would cause us to
change our decision on the City's liability. We must therefore stand on the
original denial which was conveyed to you in our letter dated March 20,
2006.

R. p. 401.
Thus even assuming the City Attorney agreed the Winegars could "amend" their
notice of claim, the Winegars' could not have reasonably relied upon any assumption that
the deadline for filing a claim was extended because, far from inducing or misleading the
Winegars into such reliance, Mr. Kunz immediately rejected the amended notice and
expressly told the Winegars the City would stand on its initial denial. As the district
court correctly found, "[t]he [City] never made a written statement which was
inconsistent with the defenses now asserted." Order, R. p. 522.
Similarly, the Winegars wholly fail to establish the elements of estoppel with
respect to the City's outdated claim form, or any of the other alleged actions which they
characterize as "violat[ing] the expectations of honesty, fairness and justice that citizens
should expect from one another and, in accordance with Rice, citizens should expect from
political entities." Winegars' Brief, p. 34. See also id. pp. 30-36.
Simply put, and as set forth above in response to the Winegars' statement of facts,
the Winegars have not established as a factual matter by affidavit, deposition testimony
or any other evidence that under the undisputed circumstances -- Mr. Kunz's persistent
responsive communications emphasizing his original date of denial, their own written
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acknowledgement of an "outright" denial, and Mr. Kunz's rejection of their "amended"
notice - that the Winegars were in fact, induced, misled or confused in any way by "the
number and significance of such actions" the Winegars' argue should give rise to
vJ

estoppel. See, e.g., Winegars' Brief, pp. 33-35. As in Davis, "Plaintiffs must exercise the
diligence necessary to effect strict compliance with the Immunity Act. And the plaintiffs
in this case failed to do so." Davis, 2006 UT 52, 148.
The Winegars' heavy reliance on Rice only serves to illustrate the deficiencies in
their argument. See, e.g., Winegars' Brief, pp. 21, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34 (citing Rice v.

vJ

Granite School District, 456 P.2d 159 (1969)). In Rice, the Court described the situation
before it as follows:
The question of whether negotiations for the compromise of a claim or debt
will give rise to an estoppel against pleading the statute of limitations
depends upon the character of the negotiations and the circumstances
surrounding the parties. In the instant action, the facts, as asserted in
plaintiffs affidavit, indicate that the adjuster for the insurance carrier
admitted liability and promised compensation upon several occasions.
Plaintiff was led to believe that the only unresolved issue was the
ascertainment of her damages, which she was informed was contingent
solely on her discharge by her doctor. If the facts be substantiated in
plaintiffs affidavit, the trier of fact could reasonably conclude that the
conduct of the adjuster was such as to induce plaintiff to delay filing her
action.
Where the delay in commencing an action is induced by the conduct of the
defendant, or his privies, or an insurance adjuster acting in his behalf, it
cannot be availed of by any of them as a defense.
One cannot justly or equitably lull an adversary into a false sense of
security thereby subjecting his claim to the bar of limitations, and then be
heard to plead that very delay as a defense to the action when brought. Acts
or conduct which wrongfully induce a party to believe an amicable
adjustment of his claim will be made may create an estoppel against
pleading the Statute of Limitations.
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Rice, 456 P.2d at163.
In this case, by contrast, the Winegars can point to no statements by which the
City or its insurer "admitted liability" or "promised compensation on several occasions,"
or "led [the Winegars] to believe that the only unresolved issue was the ascertainment of .
. . damages," all of the facts on which the Court relied in Rice. On the contrary, the
undisputed facts establish that the City's insurer explicitly informed Winegars their claim
was denied on March 20, 2007, the Winegars' acknowledged the denial, and the insurer
explicitly rejected the Winegars' amended notice and again reiterated the date of denial.

Rice is wholly inapposite.
The only other case Winegars appear to rely upon for its holding is Hill v. Board

ofEd., 183 N.J. Super. 36,443 A.2d 225 (App. Div. 1982) (see Winegars' Brief, p. 35),
but that case is similarly inapposite. In Hill, the Board did not plead the defense, and
didn't assert the defense for over two and one half years during which the Board went
forward and "obtained complete discovery in the form of answers to interrogatories,
depositions and a physical examination," and had moved to compel answers to its written
discovery. See Hill, 443 A.2d at 228. The court found such conduct "created the
objective impression that [the Board] was waiving the notice requirements." Id.
In this case, by contrast, after answering and pleading the GIA as a defense, and
before either party had conducted any discovery at all, the first action either party took
was taken by the City in moving for summary judgment based upon the limitations
defense. See Docket see also R. pp. 51-86. By the time either party started discovery,
the Winegars were on clear notice the City would rely upon the GIA' s jurisdictional
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defenses, particularly the defense that the Winegars failed to file within a year after their
claim was denied. Id.
In short, despite liberally papering their brief with opprobrious characterizations of
the City's allegedly obstructive or misleading conduct, the Winegars do not and cannot
establish the factual and legal elements necessary to estop the City from relying upon the
limitations bar imposed by the GIA. The district court correctly held the Winegars did
not comply with the GIA's requirements and the City did nothing to constitute an
estoppel. Accordingly, the Winegars have failed to establish jurisdiction, and this Court

.a

need not trouble with the additional issues the Winegars pursue on appeal.

IV.

iJ

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE EMPLOYEES
WERE ACTING WITHIN THE COURSE AND SCOPE OF THEIR
EMPLOYMENT WITH THE CITY SO THAT THE WINEGARS'
EXCLUSIVE REMEDY, IF ANY, WAS AGAINST THE CITY.
The Winegars acknowledge that the Employees are themselves immune from suit

unless "the employee acted or failed to act through fraud or willful misconduct."
Winegars' Brief, p. 48 n. 8 (quoting Utah Code Ann.§ 63 G-7-202(3)(c)(i)). As set forth
above, the Winegars would establish the requisite "willful misconduct" by: i)
characterizing the Employees actions as "illegal" and therefore outside the course and
scope of their employment, and ii) by speculating as to activities actually undertaken by
the Employees while they worked. Id. pp. 47-48. This argument also fails legally and
factually.
"Willful misconduct is the intentional doing of an act, or intentional failure to do
an act, with knowledge that serious injury is a probable result." Brown v. Frandsen, 426

39

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

P .2d 1021, 1022 (Utah 1967); see also Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain State Tel. and
Tel. Co., 709 P.2d 330, 335 (Utah 1985) ("Willful misconduct goes beyond gross
negligence in that a defendant must be aware that his conduct will probably result in
injury"); Roylance v. Davies, 424 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1967) (noting willful misconduct"
'includes a conscious or intentional violation of definite law or rule of conduct with the
knowledge of the peril to be apprehended from such act or failure to act"' (quoting Stack
v. Kearnes, 221 P.2d 594, 597 (Utah 1950)).
As the district court correctly found and concluded, however, "[t]he undisputed
evidence demonstrates that Child and Riding were not acting willfully or maliciously
outside the scope of their employment in an effort to injure the plaintiffs." R. p. 528.
The Winegars' cited no authority for the proposition that failing to obtain a permit that
may have been required constituted "willful misconduct" as that term has been defined
by Utah case law.
In addition, the Winegars' failed to adequately support the "illegality" premise of
their argument. That premise depends entirely upon the Winegars' characterization of
testimony by the City's Public Works Director indicating that without permission the
City can "go in and hand work in the creek and remove debris and so forth." R. pp. 44041. The Winegars' extrapolate from this testimony that work with a trackhoe would
therefore have been "illegal" and outside the scope of employment. Id.
Again as the district court noted, however, the Winegars did not offer admissible
evidence that the work the Employees actually did, with or without advance permission,
actually violated any particularly identified state or federal statute or was actually
40
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"illegal" by reference to any specific law. See Order, R. p. 529 ("The plaintiffs fail to
include any authority in their amended complaint that would put both the City and the
court on notice as to what provisions of federal law were violated.").
For example, the state statute which appears to have the closest application to the
undisputed circumstances and which Winegars cited and apparently rely upon for their
absence-of-permission argument is Utah Code Ann.§ 73-3-29. See First Am. Compl., R.
~

pp. 321, 325 ( citing Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-29). While that statute does indeed require
written permission before "relocat[ing] any natural stream channel or alter[ing] the beds
and banks of any natural stream," it goes on to provide:
Subject to the requirements of this section, a person may take steps
reasonably necessary to alleviate or mitigate a threat before a written permit
is issued if an emergency situation arises which involves:

(i) immediate or actual flooding ....
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-29.
There is no dispute that the Employees were responding to "immediate" and
"actual flooding." See supra p. 14, 117-19. Under the circumstances, the Winegars
unsupported extrapolations do not definitively establish any "illegal" conduct by the
Employees whatsoever.
Finally, and as set forth above, the Winegars' descriptions of the Employees
conduct in and around the stream are not supported by citations to the record below
where the details of the alleged conduct were supposedly established. See, e.g.,
Winegars' Brief, pp. 12-14 (citing the whole of their Memorandum in Opposition, "R.
431-455. "); see also id. p. 48 (without any citation whatsoever). The details or work the
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Winegars describe in support of their arguments on appeal are simply unsupported
characterizations on which this Court cannot rely. See Goodman, 2006 UT 27, il 33
("' [T]his court need not, and will not[,] consider any facts not properly cited to, or
supported by, the record. "')(second alteration and emphasis in original).

V.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE CITY WOULD
BE IMMUNE FROM THE WINEGARS' CLAIMS IN ANY EVENT
BECAUSE THE CLAIMS AROSE FROM THE MANAGEMENT AND
CONTROL OF FLOOD WATERS AND REPAIR OF THE CITY'S STORM
SYSTEM.
There is little question that irrespective of alleged negligence, the City retains

immunity under the GIA if the injuries complained of were proximately caused by:
(p) the management of flood waters ... ; [or]
(q) the construction, repair, or operation of flood or storm systems ....
See Utah Code Ann.§ 630-7-201(4). See also Barneck v. UDOT, 2015 UT 50.
In her ruling, the district court noted that the City had established certain facts
without dispute -- that Hobble Creek was and is a part of the City's storm water system,
that the City's alleged actions were a planned response to reports of flooding and the
need to clear a logjam within Hobble Creek, and that the City's actions in responding to
the situation were the alleged causes of the Winegars' injuries. See Order, R. pp. 514-15,
530. Based upon the statutory language and Barneck v. UDOT, 2015 UT 50, the district
court found that the GIA retained immunity for "injuries caused by the management of
flood waters - waters that [had] escaped a watercourse, by exceeding its bounds and
flowing out over adjacent property." See Order, R. p. 530 (quoting Barneck v. UDOT,
2015 UT 50, il 26.). See also id. (interpreting "management" as "executive efforts at
42
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planning, organizing, coordinating, or supervising the government's response to such
waters.").
On appeal, the Winegars do not dispute the applicable legal principles. See
Winegars' Brief pp. 44-46. Rather, the Winegars provide a detailed description of
alleged actions the Employees took, what order they took them in, and in response to
what conditions, apparently to at least imply that their injuries were not proximately
Lj

caused by the activities covered by the GIA' s applicable immunity retention provisions.

Id.
Like their factual arguments in response to the ruling on the Employees'
immunity, however, the Winegars' factual assertions are without any citation whatsoever
to the record where those facts were established. Id. See also id. pp. 12-14. Again, the
details of work the Winegars describe are unsupported characterizations on which this
Court cannot rely. See Goodman, 2006 UT 27,133 ("'[T]his court need not, and will
not[,] consider any facts not properly cited to, or supported by, the record."')(second
alteration and emphasis in original).

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the City respectfully requests this Court's Order
dismissing the Winegars' appeal and upholding the district court's Ruling and Order.
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